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Producer price and price transmission in a deregulated 
Ethiopian coffee market  
 






Coffee producers in Ethiopia have historically received a very small share of the export 
price of green coffee. Reasons that are often mentioned are heavy government 
intervention and high marketing and processing costs. Prior to 1992, government 
regulation of the domestic coffee market in the form of fixed producer prices and the 
monopoly power of the Ethiopian Coffee Marketing Corporation put a substantial 
wedge between the producer price and the world price of coffee by imposing an implicit 
tax on producers. The domestic coffee marketing system in Ethiopia was liberalised 
after 1992, which was envisaged to have a positive effect on producer prices and price 
transmission signals from world markets to producers. This paper, with the help of 
Cointegration and Error-Correction Model (ECM), attempts to analyse its impact. As 
findings indicate, the reforms induced stronger long-run relationships among grower, 
wholesaler and exporter prices. The estimation of the ECM shows that the short-run 
transmission of price signals from world to domestic markets has improved, but has 
remained weak in both auction-to-world and producer-to-auction markets. This might 
be explained by the weak institutional arrangement coordinating the domestic coffee 
system and contract enforcement. In general, the domestic price adjusts more rapidly 
to world price changes today than it did prior to the reforms. However, there is an 
indication that negative price changes transmit much faster than positive ones. 
 
Keywords:  Market deregulation; producer price; price transmission; price 
asymmetry 
 
1.  Background to the study 
 
Ethiopia is known as the birthplace of coffee Arabica. Coffee has been and 
remains the leading cash crop and export commodity of Ethiopia. It has 
accounted on average for about 5% of gross domestic product (GDP), 10% of 
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total agricultural production, and 60% of total export earnings for the past 
three to four decades. The sub-sector affects the livelihoods of approximately 
one quarter of the population, providing jobs for farmers, local traders, 
processors, transporters, bankers and exporters. The various taxes on the crop 
are also important sources of government revenue (CTA, 2002). Ethiopia is the 
largest coffee producer and exporter in Africa, followed by the Ivory Coast 
and Uganda. It has been contributin g  m o r e  t h a n  4 %  o f  w o r l d  c o f f e e  
production and exports since 2000 (ICO, 2006). 
 
About one million small-scale farmers produce over 95% of Ethiopia’s coffee 
on very small plots of land. Farmers in major coffee-producing areas are 
heavily dependent on coffee income as the main source of their livelihoods. In 
slack seasons when farmers lack cash income, coffee trees serve as collateral to 
obtain credit from informal moneylenders. In addition, a large proportion of 
coffee farmers are food deficit and depend on purchased food grains for 
family consumption. In years with good prices, farmers are able to purchase 
enough food for family consumption, pay their agricultural credit and 
government taxes, and meet other obligations from coffee sales. Good prices 
also have positive spill-over effects when it comes to input use, consumption 
of manufactured goods, and access to education and healthcare. Conversely, 
when coffee income fails to cover cash requirements, farmers sell off their 
assets such as oxen, land, property, etc. and/or leave their homes in search of 
work in other places (Oxfam, 2002), which in turn aggravates the status of 
household food security. 
 
Despite its economic and social importance for the Ethiopian economy, the 
performance of the coffee sub-sector has remained unsatisfactory. No 
significant change in mode of production and processing has occurred for 
several decades. Amongst other things, imperfection in the policy market and 
the low base of market infrastructure were cited as major causes of weak 
performance (IFPRI, 2003). During the military regime (1974-1991) the 
Ethiopian Coffee Marketing Corporation (ECMC), a state monopoly, operated 
using fixed price arrangements and handled about 80% of the entire coffee 
trade. Private traders had a limited role in both domestic and export 
marketing. Similarly, coffee farmers also had very limited power when it came 
to securing their proper share of the market price. 
 
According to various researchers who studied the performance of this sub-
sector prior to 1992 (Gebremariam, 1989; Mulat, 1979; ULG & Food Study 
Group, 1987), coffee growers in Ethiopia have historically received a very 
small share of the export price, receiving between 30 and 45% of the free-on-Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Worako, Van Schalkwyk, Alemu & Ayele 
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board (FOB) price, while competitors from Brazil, Colombia, Kenya and India 
were receiving above 80% of the FOB price (ICO/CFC, 2000). 
 
Since 1992 the Ethiopian government, pressured by the World Bank and the 
IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), has introduced various policy 
measures aimed at encouraging private traders to participate in a liberalised 
coffee market at all levels. These include the devaluation of the Ethiopian Birr 
from 2.07 to 5.1 Birr/$ in October 1992, foreign exchange auctioning, 
simplification of entry barriers (Pro. No. 70/1993), consolidation of all taxes 
and duties levied on coffee exports into a single tax family (Pro. No. 99/1998), 
abolition of the quota system at auction, allowing private traders to trade 
washed coffees, allowing suppliers (akrabys) and exporters to sell coffee 
domestically at market-determined prices, and so on. 
 
These coffee market reform measures aimed at opening the domestic and 
export coffee markets were envisaged to present coffee producers with ‘right 
prices’ as a means of stimulating productivity and growth, i.e. bringing 
producer prices closer to international levels and reducing disincentives 
emanating from policy and non-policy imperfections at the production and 
marketing levels. It was hypothesised that it would improve transmission of 
world and auction market price signals to domestic growers, which in turn 
was expected to improve the supply and quality of coffee. 
 
The deregulation of the marketing system opened up opportunities for the 
private sector to participate in all tiers of the marketing chain.5 As a result, the 
primary coffee marketing chain is characterised by a large number of buyers 
and sellers with relatively better levels of competition compared to the pre-
reform period.6 In 2005/06 about 1,080 active wholesalers and over 89 active 
exporters were participating in coffee marketing (AMPD, 2006). This increase 
in private participation raised the coffee supply to the auction market from 
60,000 tons in 1991 to 221,000 tons in 2005/06. However, as some anecdotal 
information on the post-reform coffee marketing system in Ethiopia shows, 
this has resulted in the concentration of power at the export market,7 
                                                 
5 In the current domestic coffee marketing chain, the coffee bean passes through the hands of several market 
players before reaching the auction market and being exported. Small amounts of coffee are produced by an 
estimated 1.3 million farming households (Agrisystems Ltd, 2001) dispersed over a wide geographical area. It is 
then collected at dispersed primary market centres by thousands of licensed or unlicensed collectors (sebsabys) 
or village traders and delivered to private or cooperative wholesalers (akrabys) or to their agents. These small 
lots are bulked and transported to processing centres, from where they are delivered to the central auction 
markets in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Eventually exporters purchase the coffee from the auction centre, 
process it to export standard and then export it to overseas markets.  
6 In 1991, prior to reform, only 14 private exporters and fewer than 200 wholesalers were involved in the 
primary and auction markets.   
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mounting illegal trade across borders, unhealthy competition in the primary 
and auction markets, and high transaction costs (AMPD, 2006; Petit, 2007). 
 
The coffee price is among the most volatile of agricultural commodity prices. 
Figure 1 depicts the average nominal price movement of producers, 
wholesalers and exporters of Ethiopian coffee from 1981 to 2006. The average 
coffee price remained high in the post-reform period (1981 to 1991), mainly 
due to the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) quota system. The price 
showed slight improvement in the initial post-reform period (i.e. 1992 to 1998) 
before dropping drastically due to the increase in world coffee production. It 
approached its lowest level in 2001/02 – known as the ‘coffee crisis’ period, 
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Figure 1:  Average producer, auction and FOB price movement 
 
Despite the drastic decline in general price level, the flow of coffee to official 
channels (auction market) and the volume of export increased more than 
threefold between 1992 and 2006.8 T h i s  m i g h t  h a v e  b e e n  d u e  t o  r e f o r m  
measures such as devaluation of the local currency, removal of all taxes on 
coffee exports, and improved roads and other marketing infrastructure. 
Although it is difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of the volume of coffee 
smuggled through parallel markets, sketchy evidence indicates that it is quite 
substantial. According to 2006 estimates by the Agricultural Market Promotion 
Department (AMPD) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
                                                 
8 As indicated by coffee statistics released by AMPD in MoARD, coffee supply to the auction market increased 
from a mere 60 thousand tons in 1991/92 to 221 thousand tons in 2006. In that same period, export increased 
from 44,000 tons to 160,000 tons.   
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(MoARD), about 15% of coffee produced in the south-western and western 
zones is smuggled via Sudan. The average quantity of coffee smuggled 
annually via Djibouti was estimated to be more than 1,000 tons in the 1990s 
(EDE Consulting for Coffee, 1997). When we consider domestic consumption, 
estimated to account for 48% of national production, less than 40% of total 
national production of coffee is directed to official export markets. 
 
As stated by Goletti and Tsigas (1995), knowledge of the extent to which 
markets are integrated is crucial for the success of market liberalisation 
policies and for investment decisions on marketing infrastructure by 
government. Indeed, the success of the reform process could be constrained by 
numerous structural deficiencies in the local markets, while the availability of 
marketing infrastructure, as well as transaction and transportation costs, 
action of traders, government policies on export taxes and exchange rates, 
have a paramount effect on price transmission. The exchange rate 
misalignment plays a major role in the rate of transmission. An increase in the 
world price may not pass to producer price due to the overvaluation of local 
currencies (Abdulai, 2000; Baffes & Gardner, 2003; Goletti & Tsigas, 1995). 
However, following on other similar market integration studies, this study 
uses the nominal exchange rate instead of the real exchange rate to calculate 
the price of coffee in US cents per pound (Krivonos, 2004).9 
 
As indicated earlier, although there have been promising achievements in the 
volume of production and export, very little is known about the integration 
and transmission of price signals between different levels of coffee markets in 
the years following the reforms. Therefore, principal questions addressed by 
this study are whether the reforms in the Ethiopian coffee market have 
resulted in a closer relationship between world (FOB), producer and auction 
market prices and whether the market reforms have improved the producer 
share of the export price by area and type of coffee. The study utilises the 
cointegration approach, specifically employing the autoregressive distributed 
lag model (ARDLM) and error-correction model (ECM) to answer the above 
questions.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology and 
data sources; Section 3 discusses the results of the estimates of the 
cointegration analysis and error-correction model; and finally Section 4 
presents the conclusion and policy recommendations. 
                                                 
9 The following methods were followed to arrive at the price of coffee: Using a common method, the various 
coffee types were converted to their clean coffee equivalent. Next, the average monthly coffee price reported by 
the government and the prevailing exchange rate were used to calculate the price of coffee in US cents per 
pound. In general, it is a common trend to use nominal prices instead of real prices in market integration studies 
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2.  The model and data sources 
 
2.1  The model  
 
Earlier studies on cointegration (e.g. Richardson, 1978) relied on simple 
correlation between prices in the pairs of markets. Later, Stigler and Sherwin 
(1985) considered the correlation of price differences. Gupta and Mueller 
(1982) also employed Granger causality to measure the price relationship 
between markets, while Delgado (1986) used a variance decomposition 
approach to evaluate integration between markets. The seminal work by 
Ravallian (1986) was considered the most prominent innovation and progress 
in time series modelling (Barrett, 1996). The cointegration together with error-
correction model (ECM) of Engle and Granger (1987) has received important 
recognition for the specification and estimations of dynamic economic models. 
Unlike the static framework, the ECM includes a dynamic component that 
captures the effect of adjustment of the dependent variable when it deviates 
from its long-term equilibrium level. Hence in this study an ECM is specified 
to account for the dynamic nature of price adjustment. Short-run price 
transmission, the speed of adjustment and the equilibrium producer price 
share are estimated before and after the reforms. Asymmetric price 
transmission is tested in both periods to check whether price increases are 
passed through to producers as rapidly as price decreases and whether the 
nature of the asymmetry has changed following the reforms. Using the 
estimated parameters, we can compare how long it would take the domestic 
price to adjust to a one-time change in the world market price. 
 
Methodologically, this study is substantially different from earlier works. 
Firstly, since Ethiopian coffee varieties are often differentiated by agro-
ecology, locality, shape, acidity, body, flavour, aroma, processing method and 
demand by importing countries, they are separately auctioned by their 
respective origins. In contrast to many coffee-exporting countries, coffee from 
Ethiopia is traded separately in the world market based on the origin of 
production (i.e. as Sidama, Yirgachefe, Harar, Wollega, Jimma or Limu coffee). 
Recently, Ethiopia secured exclusive trademark rights for Sidama, Harar and 
Yirgachefe coffees, which serves to further highlight the differences between 
Ethiopian coffee types. Each coffee type fetches a different price at the 
producer, auction and export (FOB) level of the market. For instance, between 
1992 and 2006, Harar, Wollega, Yirgachefe, Sidama and Jimma coffee fetched 
on average 143, 108, 106, 104 and 92 US cents per pound respectively – which 
clearly depicts the differences in the quality and price of these coffee types. 
Thus the study disaggregates the analysis into major commercial coffee types 
to evaluate whether there are differences in price transmission and level of 
integration. Secondly, since most producers in developing countries – Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Worako, Van Schalkwyk, Alemu & Ayele 
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including Ethiopia – are linked to the world market through domestic 
intermediary markets (e.g. auction markets), this study includes the Ethiopian 
Coffee Auction Market (ECAM) as an intermediary market.  
 
The inclusion of the auction market is motivated by the literature, which 
reflects that intermediaries are better positioned than coffee growers in terms 
of access to world price information. It is hypothesised that there is a strong 
tendency for much of the benefit from positive world price changes to be 
appropriated by intermediaries rather than coffee growers, which may defeat 
the very objective of the coffee sector reform. Therefore, the price transmission 
analysis is at three distinct levels: (1) world market to auction, (2) auction to 
producers, and (3) world market to producers. 
 
The model specification of this study follows the dynamic approach adopted 
by Baffes and Gardner (2003) and Krivonos (2004). An autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model includes the lagged value of the domestic price 
and world price as independent variables specified as follows: 
 








t P P P P ε β β β α + + + + = − − 1 3 1 2 1  ………………………………………. (1) 
 
This can be rearranged to yield an error specification  
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Equation (2) describes the variation of domestic price
d P in terms of its reaction 
to fluctuations in the world price
w P and adjustment to own long-term 
equilibrium. δ captures the immediate responsiveness of the domestic price to 
changes in the world price, and θ is an error-correction term, which measures 
the speed of adjustment of 
d P to the long-run equilibrium
w
t P γ . 
 
To capture the impact of the reforms on the parameters and to test asymmetric 
price transmission, two sets of dummies are used. One is a set of policy 
dummies, 
 
                   1 =
ref
t D  if a period prior to reform,  
                  0 =
ref
t D  if a period after reform. 
 
The other is a set of dummies that describes whether a price increase or price 
decrease has occurred:  Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Worako, Van Schalkwyk, Alemu & Ayele 
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                 1 =
Δ
t D if  0 < Δ t P (for increase in price), 
         and  0 =
Δ
t D if  0 ≥ Δ t P (for decrease in price) where    1 − − = Δ t t t P P P  
 
The policy dummies interact with all independent variables, and the dummies 
that denote the sign of the price change are interacted with the short-run 
elasticity of transmission δ  to test for the presence of short-run asymmetric 
price transmission. 
 
For the ECM to be valid, we first need to ensure that the time series used in the 
estimation is stationary. The stationary properties of the price-time series (both 
levels and first differences) are tested using the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) procedure. In each case the hypothesis tested is that the time series 
follows stationary processes with the unit root. Rejecting the null hypothesis 
allows the time series to be tested as stationary. In addition, the existence of a 
long-term cointegration relationship between world (FOB), auction and 
domestic prices is tested in order to check the validity of the error-correction 
part equation (2). The basic long-run model without a structural break is 
 




t v P P + = γ  …………………………………………………………… (3) 
The constant is restricted to zero, so that γ can be interpreted directly as the 
share of producer price in world market price. Three OLS regressions are 
estimated: separate regression before and after the reforms and pooled 
regression with structural break. The latter model allows estimation of two 
different slope coefficients while utilising all available data: 
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In each case, an ADF test on the residuals is performed to determine whether 
the OLS results adequately describe the cointegrating relationship among 












t P ). The residual  t v from pooled 
regression (4) is then used to estimate the ECM for each coffee price by area, 
given that the ADF test supports the validity of the model: 
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The δs describe the short-run responsiveness of domestic price to world price 
increases and decreases after and before reforms. The θs are parameters 
capturing pre- and post-reform speed of adjustment to long-term equilibrium 
in domestic price. The estimated coefficients can be used to calculate how long 
it would take the domestic price to fully adjust to a one-time change in the Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Worako, Van Schalkwyk, Alemu & Ayele 
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world price. With a change in the world market price occurring at time t = 0, 
the new long-term equilibrium level of the domestic price is γ(pw + Δpw). In 
the initial period, the domestic price changes by δΔpw. In the subsequent 
period an error-correction component is added. The degree of adjustment of 
the domestic price relative to full adjustment n periods after the change in the 
world price equals 
 





) 1 )( (
1
+ −
= …………………………………………………... (6) 
 
The model specification for cointegration between auction and world price 
and for auction and producer price employs the same approach. 
 
2.2  Data and sources 
 
The producer, auction and free-on-board (FOB) prices are the three major 
time-series prices on which the analysis centres. Each price series is based on 
monthly prices that extend from October 1992 to September 2006. The price 
data includes four major Ethiopian coffee types by origin of growing region 
(Sidama, Harar, Wollega and Jimma), each with three distinct price series 
(producer, auction and FOB). As the fifth category, the analysis includes 
national average price (average of all coffee prices). All data used in this study 
was obtained from published and officially compiled government coffee 
statistics. 
 
Producer price was obtained from the monthly published survey reports 
(Bulletins Nos. 44 to 377)10 of the Central Statistical Agency (CSA). Auction 
and FOB11 prices were obtained from the Agricultural Market Promotion 
Department (AMPD) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MoARD) from unpublished coffee statistics bulletins compiled for the period 
1981 to 2006.  
 
To facilitate the comparison, all price data has been converted to clean coffee 
equivalent and then to US cents per pound (US cents/lb), which is the 
standard international unit of measurement used by the International Coffee 
Organization (ICO) and others. The official exchange rate from the National 
                                                 
10 The CSA has been conducting a monthly survey on “Average Producer Price of Agricultural Commodities 
(APAC)” and reports are published monthly since 1981. The following bulletins of producer price survey reports 
were used to compile producer price data for coffee: Bulletins Nos. 44, 59, 65, 105, 116, 122, 137, 138, 139, 
141, 148, 149, 155, 162, 166, 173, 176, 181, 188, 190, 211, 273, 277, 291, 292, 293, 294, 298, 300, 306, 311, 
341, 343, 344, 346, 374 and 377. 
11 FOB price here refers to the price of each coffee type, which includes value of coffee, cost of transportation to 
port, plus cost of loading onto ship. In other words, it is payment made in foreign currency to the exporter.  Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Worako, Van Schalkwyk, Alemu & Ayele 
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Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) has been used to convert producer and auction prices 
that are reported in terms of local currency. Finally, all the prices have been 
transformed into natural logarithms in order to mitigate the fluctuation of 
individual series, to increase the likelihood of stationarity after first 
differencing and to ease interpretation of the coefficients. 
 
3.    Results of estimation  
 
3.1    Results of stationarity tests 
 
The results of the stationarity tests conducted for the price variables are 
reported in Table 1. The properties of each price time series are analysed firstly 
in terms of their descriptive statistics, including a normality test. At the level 
of all producer prices, the ADF test does not reject the null hypothesis that the 
price series follows a unit root process or is found nonstationary for all prices. 
However, testing the same hypothesis for first differences allows the rejection 
of the unit root hypothesis at 1% level of significance for all 15 types of coffee 
prices at three different levels. This leads to the conclusion that price 
differentials can be used in the ECM. 
 
Table 1:   Stationarity of producer, auction and world prices  
ADF test statistics (without trend)   
Producer price  Auction price  FOB/world price  
Coffee type  At level  First 
difference 
At level  First 
difference 
At level  First 
difference 
Harar coffee  -2.300  -7.429*** -1.740 -6.560*** -0.707  -7.108*** 
Jimma coffee  -2.382  -6.265 *** -2.307  -6.570*** -1.885  -6.489*** 
Sidama coffee  -1.936  -6.371*** -2.387 -8.820*** -1.451  -7.286*** 
Wollega coffee  -2.062  -7.220*** -1.645 -6.444*** -1.581  -6.468*** 
National average   -2.222  -6.395*** -1.007 -6.880*** -1.052  -6.323*** 
Null of unit root rejected at 1% *** Null of unit root rejected at 5% **  
Null of unit root rejected at 10% * 
 
3.2    Cointegration between prices  
 
Turning to the long term, cointegration between the producer and auction, 
auction and FOB and producer and FOB prices is estimated using equation (4) 
for three different periods (pre-reform, post-reform, and pooled regression 
with structural break). The two-step Engle and Granger approach is followed 
to estimate the series. To evaluate the long-run relationship, the residual from 
two single series (linear combination of series) is tested using the ADF test. 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected when the ADF test for unit 
root is brought about at order of zero I(0) (see Table 2). Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Worako, Van Schalkwyk, Alemu & Ayele 
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When the cointegration between auction and producer prices is evaluated, it is 
found to be highly significant for Wollega and national average prices for pre-
reform, post-reform and pooled regression with structural break. This may 
account for the fact that although producer prices were highly regulated by 
the government prior to reform, it was continuously adjusted with auction 
price movement. In the later period (after deregulation) there was relatively 
better competition due to private sector participation in both producer and 
auction markets. The significance of the Sidama producer price in the pre-
reform period may be attributed to the reasons mentioned above. However, 
Harar and Jimma producer and auction prices lack considerable long-run 
relationships for none of the periods. This may be attributed to the fact that the 
Harar auction market is historically dominated by a few giant traders, even 
post-reform. For instance, four top traders accounted for 60% of the Dire Dawa 
auction trade between 1992 and 2006 (AMPD, 2006). Moreover, collectors and 
wholesalers in the primary markets also work as agent for exporters – 
implying the possibility of the distortion of price setting and lack of healthy 
competition. In the case of Jimma, a weak long-run relationship between 
producer and auction price results from high transportation and transaction 
costs. Due to the fact that the Addis Ababa auction market, where Jimma 
coffee is auctioned, is located on average 450 kilometres away from Jimma’s 
coffee production area, traders face considerable marketing and transaction 
costs. 
 
Table 2:   ADF test statistics for cointegration between pairs of prices  
  (1) Cointegration b/n 
producer & auction prices 
(2.) Cointegration b/n auction 
and world prices 
(3) Cointegration b/n 
producer and world prices 
  
 























































Harar coffee  -2.54  -1.6  -2.5* -5.92*** -3.9*** -3.84*** -2.33  -3.2*** -3.80*** 
Jimma coffee   -1.25  -2.1  -2.42* -2.36* -1.72  -2.15* -1.42  -2.15  -2.63* 
Sidama coffee   -1.92  4.8*** -2.2  -4.80*** -5.7*** -5.69*** -1.93*  -2.67**  -4.52*** 
Wollega coffee   -6.8*** -6.7*** -7.6*** -5.54*** 5.3*** -5.32*** -2.41*  -3.21***  -3.0*** 
National 
average  
-3.9*** -4.6** -4.2*** -5.95*** 6.4*** -6.41*** -1.72  -2.54** -4.4*** 
Null of unit root rejected at 1% ***    Null of unit root rejected at 5% **  Null of unit root rejected at 10% *  
 
In contrast to the above, the results of the estimation for world and auction 
price cointegration have shown a considerable long-run relationship between 
two prices in almost all of the cases. The ADF test rejects the null hypothesis at 
1% level of significance. This finding is consistent with prior expectations and 
is due to the intermediaries (i.e. wholesalers and exporters) in the auction and 
export markets being better positioned in terms of access to world price Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Worako, Van Schalkwyk, Alemu & Ayele 
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information than coffee growers who are at the beginning of the marketing 
chain. In most cases, wholesales, exporters and foreign importing companies 
maintain long-term relationships and close information exchange. 
 
The estimate results for producer and world prices for each type of coffee 
indicate that none of the prices has shown significant cointegration for the pre-
reform period. However, in the post-reform period, with the exception of 
Jimma coffee, the other four categories have shown an acceptable level of 
relationship. Interestingly, the result of the pooled regression with structural 
break was found significant at 1% for Harar, Sidama, Wollega and national 
average price – implying convergence of all prices to equilibrium in the long 
run. 
 
3.3    Producer share of prices 
 
The estimates of the pre- and post-liberalisation share of the producer price in 
world price are reported in Table 3. In most cases, the reform measures have 
increased the target share of producer price in world price. In the post-reform 
period, the percentage share of producer price in world price has increased in 
that the national average has grown from 48% to nearly 59%. This varies with 
the type and quality of coffee. However, compared to competing countries, the 
producer share of the world price remains low. 
 
Table 3:   Producer share of FOB (world) price by coffee type  
With structural break  Type of coffee 
Pre-reform (%)  Post-reform (%) 
Harar coffee   48  65 
Sidama coffee   45  56 
Jimma coffee   49  57 
Wollega coffee   50  64 
National average   48  59 
 
Multiple factors are contributing to this low share. Transport costs and 
government-related taxes account for 35 to 45% of the price spread between 
producer and auction. Most wholesalers depend on rented trucks in the peak 
supply seasons. Although there has been enhanced competition since market 
liberalisation in the primary market compared to the pre-reform period, 
wholesalers retain some monopoly power.12 When there is a slight drop in the 
coffee price at auction or in international markets, wholesalers – mainly in the 
remote markets – further depress prices at local markets and withhold their 
supply when there is a price increase. At present, government-related coffee 
                                                 
12 In the current coffee marketing chain about 40% of wholesalers from major coffee-growing zones are 
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marketing costs include regional sales tax (for washed coffee Birr 0.60 and for 
unwashed coffee Birr 0.30), municipality tax (Birr 0.20), a parking fee at 
quality-inspection areas (Birr 0.08), a liquoring fee (Birr 0.03) and export tax 
(Birr 1.41 per kg of export coffee). This adds up to an average of Birr 2 per kg 
or about 20% of producer price. 
 
3.4    Results of price asymmetry  
 
The results of the ECM are reported in Table 4. Since no long-run cointegration 
was detected for Jimma coffee in any of the three periods, no ECM is estimated 
for the Jimma coffee price. The conclusion in this case is simply that the 
reforms did not produce greater integration of domestic and world prices for 
all types equally, and therefore Jimma coffee prices remain isolated from 
international prices. However, as indicated in Table 2, most of the prices are 
better integrated in the post-reform period compared to the pre-reform period. 
 
Table 4:   Error-correction model with asymmetric price transmission  










Pre-reform (δ1) 0.29** 0.19  0.16 0.17  Price 
decrease   Post-reform (δ3) -0.15  0.34* 0.12  0.31* 
Pre-reform (δ2) 0.51*** 0.17  0.15 0.43* 
 
Short-run 
transmission  Price 
increase  Post-reform (δ4) 0.001  0.16  0.028 -0.03 
Pre-reform (Ө1) -0.24*** -0.07* -0.10*** -0.10**  Speed of adjustment  
Post-reform (Ө2) -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.11** 
 
Short-term transmission of the price decrease from world to producer, both 
pre- and post-reform, is indicated in  1 δ  and  3 δ  respectively. It is found higher 
and significant for the national average coffee price in the post-reform period 
compared to the pre-reform period (Table 4). Similarly, the short-term 
transmission of the price decrease for Sidama coffee is highly significant in the 
post-reform period, because in the pre-reform period the government set floor 
prices to protect producers from negative price shocks, but the role of 
government was diluted with market liberalisation policies. Conversely, such 
transmission was higher for Harar in the pre-reform period compared to the 
post-reform period. As explained earlier, this can be attributed to dominance 
of the Hrarar auction market by a few traders in the pre-reform period. 
 
Short-term transmission of the price increase from world to producer, both 
before and after the reforms, is depicted in  2 δ  and  4 δ  respectively. The 
transmission in this case was far better prior to the reforms than after the 
reforms. For instance, prior to the reforms, a one-dollar increase in the world 
price caused an increase of 0.51, 0.17, and 0.15 cents in Harar, Sidama and 
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to close to zero transmissions for Harar and Wollega and 0.16 for Sidama. 
There are no cases where price increases were transmitted more fully than 
price decreases. This finding is consistent with Krivonos (2004), who found 
that producers now bear the entire cost of price decline, while the transmission 
of price increase remains minimal. 
 
To understand how the reforms affected the speed at which domestic prices 
react to changes in world prices, it is useful to calculate the degree of 
adjustment of the internal price to a one-time change in the world price. The 
results for adjustment 6 and 12 months after a change in the world price are 
reported in Table 5. All types of coffee mentioned above adjust faster today to 
changes in world market prices than they used to. The degree of adjustment to 
price increases after six months has increased for all types in the post-reform 
period compared to the pre-reform period. Adjustment is relatively higher for 
Wollega and Sidama coffee. 
 
Table 5:   Degree of adjustment of producer price to one-time change in 
world price 
Price decrease  Price increase   
Type of coffee 
 
Adjustment after … 
months  
Pre-reform   Post-reform   Pre-reform   Post-reform  
6 months   40%  85%  53%  45%  Harar  
12 months   72%  88%  67%  68% 
6 months   51%  76%  60%  68%  Sidama 
12 months   69%  85%  87%  83% 
6 months   55%  70%  52%  65%  Wollega  
12 months   75%  86%  74%  84% 
6 months   58%  74%  54%  45%  National average 
12 months   78%  87%  70%  64% 
Source: Calculated using price data from CSA and CTSC Team of MoARD 
 
4.    Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Using cointegration analysis and an error-correction model (ECM), this study 
examines price transmission from the world coffee market to local markets, 
auction to producers, and from the world to auction markets. The results show 
that the share of producer price in the world price has increased substantially 
for all coffee since reforms were introduced. There is greater integration 
between the domestic and world markets and world and auction markets (for 
some) at present than prior to the reforms, and the transmission of world price 
signals has improved in most cases. 
 
The impact of the liberalisation process seems to have been limited due to lack 
o f  a n  a d e q u a t e  m a r k e t  i n f o r m a t i o n  s y s t e m ,  p o o r  a c c e s s  t o  c r e d i t ,  h i g h  
marketing costs (mainly transportation), and high transaction costs related to Agrekon, Vol 47, No 4 (December 2008)    Worako, Van Schalkwyk, Alemu & Ayele 
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searching for potential buyers, collusion, and high market share by a few 
exporters in the current coffee market. This is justified by the result that some 
p r i c e s  h a v e  r e l a t i v e l y  b e t t e r  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  w h i l e  o t h e r s  h a v e  w e a k  o r  n o  
integration, which is consistent with initial expectations. Moreover, Jimma 
coffee has been found to be weakly integrated or not integrated for all three 
categories of analysis. Wollega and Sidama coffee have also experienced high 
asymmetric price transmission. 
 
It should be noted that greater price transmission of world market prices may 
in fact work to the disadvantage of producers in the short run. With world 
market prices on a steady decline since the early 2000s, fixed domestic prices 
at a pre-crisis level would have been preferred by producers. Moreover, this 
study shows that in some cases, the impact of the reforms on price 
transmission has been somewhat asymmetric, rising more for price decreases 
than for price increases, meaning that growers now bear the full cost of price 
drops, while the transmission of positive price shocks has not changed much. 
 
A greater pass-through of price changes at the time of falling prices is 
unfavourable to producers who may lack resources to cope with price risks. In 
many post-reform systems, coffee growers are left entirely uninsured against 
low prices. Artificially high government-supported producer prices are, 
however, unsustainable in the long run because of the large public outlays 
such support schemes would require. An alternative approach would be to 
give growers access to price-risk management instruments, such as trademark 
licensing, fair and organic coffee marketing, or programmes to stimulate local 
consumption, at least to insulate the short-term effect. 
 
In general, dismantling market parastatals and removing inappropriate 
policies are necessary but not sufficient conditions for efficient private markets 
to evolve. In the absence of appropriate infrastructure, institutions and legal 
reforms, spatially distributed markets may continue to lack integration. Hence 
Ethiopia has to shift from merely ‘getting prices right’ to ‘getting institutions 
right’ so as to address market failures arising from imperfect information, 
contract enforcement and property rights, as well as insufficient provision of 
public goods in order to improve the lives of primary producers. In addition, 
Ethiopia has several policy menus on the shelf, but what is lacking is 
implementation, and hence it is highly important to pay more attention to 
implementation.  
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